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The question is, does history that has discovered its own meaning 
still have any meaning? And is it history anymore?
— Václav Havel, “Stories and Totalitarianism”
For more than a century, phenomenology’s relation to history has remained a problem for 
phenomenological analysis. This can in part be attributed to the circumstances surrounding 
the beginnings of  phenomenology. As Europe moved increasingly toward world war at the 
turn of  the 20th century, a growing consciousness of  the historical relativity of  all values 
and knowledge spread throughout the continent, leading Ernst Troeltsch to speak of  the 
“crisis of  historicism” (Rand 1964, 504-05). In this same context, Edmund Husserl framed 
phenomenological analysis in opposition to history. While Husserl (2002) recognized the 
“tremendous value” that history has to offer philosophical thinking, he believed that a 
purely historical reduction of  consciousness necessarily results in the relativity of  historical 
understanding itself, like a serpent that bites its own tail (280). If  phenomenology was to be 
a genuine science, it had to attempt a phenomenological reduction which would seize upon 
the essence of  our historical being, i.e., our essence as beings that exist within history and 
are inseparable from it. What was required over and beyond a historical understanding of  
lived experience was an analysis of  the structure of  historicity itself  (293-94). 
 Since Husserl’s representation of  the relationship between phenomenology and history 
in 1911, phenomenologists have worked to re-problematize this relationship—and this 
includes the recent line of  analysis which has taken the name “critical phenomenology.” 
As Gail Weiss, Ann V. Murphy, and Gayle Salamon (2019) have suggested, critical 
phenomenology makes use of  phenomenological description to analyze the ways that 
power relations structure our experience. Critical phenomenologists examine the socio-
historical conditions behind the perceptual patterns and affective dispositions of  the body, 
as well as the conditions behind the phenomenological attitude itself. Now, insofar as critical 
phenomenology concerns itself  with the socio-historical conditions of  phenomenological 
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analysis, it seems to turn back on Husserl’s assessment of  history, and moreover on his 1911 
correspondence with Wilhelm Dilthey. While Husserl called for a phenomenology which 
would make intelligible the structure of  historicity itself, it was Dilthey who suggested that 
understanding needed to be reconceived as a hermeneutic activity: an interpretive activity 
which turns back on itself  and moves between lived experience and history.
 The aim of  this paper is to revisit Husserl and Dilthey’s 1911 correspondence in order 
to develop a deeper perspective on this tendency in critical phenomenological research: 
the tendency to historicize lived experience. I argue for two theses. First, while both Husserl 
and Dilthey recognized that lived experience is always historically situated, they diverged 
in their approaches to the interpretation of  historicity—Husserl adopting a transcendental 
approach, and Dilthey a hermeneutic approach. This divergence grew out of  Husserl and 
Dilthey’s solutions to the crisis of  historicism, and it led them to adopt opposed views on 
the activity of  historicizing. Second, while Husserl’s treatment of  historicity is in tension 
with critical phenomenology’s commitment to historicizing the phenomenological attitude, 
Dilthey’s treatment suggests that our historicity needs to be interpreted as something 
that is itself  socially and historically conditioned. Dilthey’s attempt to achieve a truly 
hermeneutic conception of  understanding led him to represent historicizing as a source 
of  radical possibility. Accordingly, his disagreement with Husserl offers insight for critical 
phenomenology’s treatment of  the relationship between phenomenology and history.  
DILTHEY AND THE CRISIS OF HISTORICISM
In 1873, Wilhelm Dilthey observed that Europe was undergoing a “great crisis” as a 
consequence of  the rise of  historical consciousness (quoted in Ermarth 1978, 15).1 By 
“historical consciousness,” Dilthey referred to the awareness that the whole of  one’s 
existence is a product of  history. As historical science became increasingly prominent across 
Europe during the 19th century, human beings were made increasingly conscious of  the 
historicity of  all things, and were compelled to historicize every aspect of  their nature: 
their reason, values, instincts, etc. Even knowledge itself  had to be historicized, leading to 
the conclusion that our knowledge of  history was itself  something historically relative. All 
aspects of  human life were suddenly in crisis—a situation Troeltsch would describe fifty 
years later as the “crisis of  historicism” (Rand 1964, 504-05).  
 In contrast to Troeltsch—who saw no other way to counteract the crisis of  historicism 
than by looking to the ahistorical—Dilthey believed the solution to this crisis must be sought 
1 Dilthey had made similar observations before this. As a student in the 1860’s, Dilthey (1978) observed 
that “the problems of  philosophy, history, and politics are now mutually intertwined” (15).
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in historical consciousness itself.2 This is seen in his description of  “the problem posed by 
this epoch”:
[E]verything historical is relative in the sense that if  we gather it 
all in consciousness, it seems to surreptitiously breed dissolution, 
skepticism, and impotent subjectivity. This exposes the problem 
posed by this epoch. What is relative must be brought into a more 
fundamental connection with what is universally valid . . . Surely, 
historical consciousness itself  must contain the rules and the power 
for dedicating ourselves freely and with sovereignty, in the fact of  the 
past, to a unified goal of  human culture. (Dilthey 2019, 158-59)
What is distinct about Dilthey’s response to the crisis of  historicism is that he did not believe 
we could turn to an ahistorical system of  thinking such as positivism or metaphysics. For 
Dilthey the way forward was not attempting to transcend the historicity of  human life, 
but rather, attempting to examine the nature of  historical consciousness. Such an attempt 
would resemble the Kantian project in its determination of  the essential limitations of  
historical consciousness, but with a major difference: “Kant’s a priori is fixed and dead; but 
the real conditions of  consciousness and its presuppositions, as I grasp them, constitute a 
living historical process, a development” (Dilthey 1989, 500-01). Dilthey names this project 
a “critique of  historical reason”: a critique of  human beings’ capacity to know themselves 
and their history from within history (165).  
 Dilthey believed his critique of  historical reason would provide an epistemological 
foundation for future research in the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), i.e., future research 
which concerns human life, society, and history. Yet the task of  this critique extended well 
beyond epistemology: what was in question for Dilthey was the philosophical character of  
living historically.3 In search of  something “universally valid,” Dilthey identifies the starting 
point for such a critique as a return to lived experience (Erlebnis): the pre-reflective reality 
in which “what is there for me” is solely the content of  consciousness. In the “Breslau 
Draft,” he asserts “the principle of  phenomenality”: the principle that “[e]verything is a fact of  
consciousness, and accordingly is subject to the conditions of  consciousness” (1989, 247). 
Against any metaphysical belief  in an external world or the unchanging identity of  the 
subject behind experience, Dilthey argues that “knowledge may not posit a reality that is 
independent of  lived experience” (202). Lived experience is both the starting point and 
context for all possible understanding, and this includes our understanding of  the past. 
 Yet Dilthey complicates this principle by introducing a second principle: that the 
psychical nexus which encompasses the facts of  consciousness must be recognized as 
contained “in the totality of  psychic life” (263-64). For Dilthey, to speak of  lived experience 
2 Troeltsch (1964) attempts to counteract the crisis of  historicism by turning to an ahistorical Neo-Pla-
tonism (48ff.).
3 In his correspondence with Dilthey in 1895, Count Yorck von Wartenburg suggests that Dilthey refer
to the character of  being historical as “historicity.” While Heidegger reads into this correspondence 
that it was Count Yorck von Wartenburg who recognized the true difference between the “ontical” and 
the “Historical,” it should be emphasized that Count Yorck was attempting to designate what he saw in 
Dilthey’s own project (Dilthey & v. Wartenburg 2020, 185-86).
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as something singular is an “abstraction”: lived experience exists within the movement 
of  time, and therefore is what it is because it is a part of  psychic life understood as an 
interconnected temporal whole (67). Lived experience is always situated within the fullness 
of  social and historical life, and correspondingly acquires its meaning from the context 
of  our relationships with others, our socio-cultural context, and history itself  (1989, 279-
84). Notice how this second principle completely transforms what Dilthey means by 
phenomenality (i.e., the notion that everything is a fact of  consciousness) and moreover 
prefigures the recent emphasis made by critical phenomenologists on the socio-historical 
conditions of  experience. While it remains the case that “what is there for me” exists solely 
in lived experience, it is nevertheless the case that lived experience is itself  an abstraction 
insofar as it exists within the movement of  time. Lived experience and history are related to 
one another as part and whole within the interconnected nexus of  life itself—what Dilthey 
calls the life-nexus (Lebenszusammenhang).4
 Dilthey’s solution to the crisis of  historicism is seen in his attempt to fundamentally 
reconceive of  Verstehen (understanding). In multiple works, Dilthey identifies the foundation 
of  the human sciences as descriptive psychology: the study of  the connectedness of  psychic 
life. This appeal to descriptive psychology has been a source of  extreme confusion amongst 
Dilthey’s readers. While some have criticized Dilthey for trying to replace empirical 
psychology with an introspective “armchair psychology,” what Dilthey (2010) actually 
means by descriptive psychology is not an analysis of  psychic life as an introspective reality, 
but rather psychic life as the context of  understanding.5 He writes:
Life is the basic fact that must form the starting point of  philosophy. 
Life is that with which we are acquainted from within and behind 
which we cannot go. . . . Life is historical to the degree that it is 
apprehended as advancing in time and as an emerging productive 
nexus. Life as history is possible because this process is re-created 
in memory, not as the production of  its particulars, but as the re-
creation of  the nexus itself  and its stages. . . . That is history. (280)
For Dilthey, descriptive psychology refers to the study of  psychic life understood as “an 
emerging productive nexus”: a nexus in which lived experience and history are related to 
one another as part and whole. In contrast to empirical psychology, which accepts as its 
starting point a distinction between subject and object, descriptive psychology analyzes life 
itself  as the context within which lived experience emerges, and thus as a context that is 
intersubjective and historical from the beginning. In this way, Dilthey’s descriptive psychology 
is founded upon a fundamental reevaluation of  what understanding is—a reevaluation 
which recognizes that the “object” of  understanding is the context of  understanding itself. 
For Dilthey, understanding needs to be reconceived as a hermeneutic activity: an activity in 
which we continually turn back on the conditions of  our own understanding and move 
between lived experience and history. While lived experience needs to be interpreted on the 
4 In addition to Dilthey’s description of  the life-nexus in his “Breslau Draft,” see (1977, 35; 2010, 214-18).
5 In particular, this criticism is made by Ebbinghaus (De Mul 2014, 187-89). 
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basis of  our understanding of  our historical situatedness, history needs to be interpreted on 
the basis of  what is given in lived experience.6 
 For our purposes, what is most important to emphasize in Dilthey’s reevaluation of  
understanding is that the activity of  historicizing becomes a source of  radical possibility. In 
Formation of  the Historical World in the Human Sciences, Dilthey (2010) describes understanding 
as the activity of  interpreting what is given to us in experience (e.g., the expressions of  
others, works of  art, political movements, etc.) as “objectifications” of  life itself  (103-05).7 
Using Hegel’s concept of  objective spirit, Dilthey suggests that everything in the world is 
an objectification of  life insofar as it is always already connected to us as parts of  the same 
life-nexus. What seems to exist “outside” of  us is in fact related to us within “the inner reality 
of  life,” and therefore provides the material for an understanding of  the life-nexus. Dilthey 
describes the activity of  interpreting this material as a process of  “gradual elucidation”:
Lived experiences . . . seem to only give us knowledge of  something 
singular . . .  [yet] understanding overcomes this limitation of  
the individual lived experience . . . Understanding presupposes 
experience, but lived experience only becomes life-experience if  
understanding leads us from the narrowness and subjectivity of  
experiencing into the region of  the whole and the general. . . . The 
basic relationship between lived experience and understanding 
is [therefore] that of  mutual dependence. . . .  Understanding 
constantly widens the range of  historical knowledge . . . [while] at 
the same time the extension of  the historical horizon makes possible 
the formation of  ever more general and fruitful concepts. (162-7)
For Dilthey, understanding presents the possibility of  experiencing beyond the narrowness 
of  our own lived experience. By utilizing what is given in experience to acquire a sense 
for history, we become able to re-interpret our own experience on the basis of  the lived 
realities of  others, of  society, and of  history. The relationship between understanding and 
lived experience remains one of  mutual dependence, however, insofar as our conception 
of  history is continually re-opened by what is given to us in experience. What emerges in 
lived experience will change our understanding of  the way things have been in the past, 
and thus the meaning that is contained in historical life is for Dilthey necessarily something 
open and indefinite.8
6 Dilthey insists that such an activity must be interdisciplinary, moreover, insofar as it is only through the 
collective effort of  the human sciences that we grasp the fullness of  our hermeneutic situation.
7 Amongst things that are given in the socio-historical world, Dilthey (1989) makes a distinction between 
systems of  culture and external organizations (94). A system of  culture is a “complex of  purposes” that is 
formed when various individuals become related to one another through shared purposes (e.g., religion, 
law, and art). An external organization of  society is an association of  wills that is formed when individual 
wills unite to form a single whole: a community, a framework, a “state.”
8 While Dilthey (1989) recognizes that continual re-interpretation brings us closer to the meaning of  
historicity, he insists that a complete scientific account is not possible (440).
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 Insofar as Dilthey (2010) believed the activity of  historicizing enables us to experience 
lived realities beyond the narrowness of  our own experience, he represented historicizing 
as a source of  radical possibility: “[h]uman beings bound and limited by the reality of  life 
are liberated not only by art . . . but also by the understanding of  the historical” (237). Yet 
Dilthey also went a step further than this: he suggested that we are able to experience not 
merely lived realities beyond our own, but lived realities of  the past precisely as they were (i.e., 
“re-experiencing”). This claim has been widely criticized by 20th century hermeneutic 
thinkers like Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer: it assumes the past is fixed in 
some way, and thereby contradicts Dilthey’s suggestion that the meaning of  the historical 
nexus is open and indefinite. This claim points toward a larger problem, moreover: the 
tension between Dilthey’s commitment to the possibility of  universally valid understanding 
and his commitment to the historicity of  all understanding (Bambach 2019, 92). Although 
Dilthey (1960) reconceives of  understanding as a hermeneutic activity, he maintained that 
a genuine understanding of  lived experience would need to be one that remains valid 
outside of  our historical circumstances (233). 
 This tension between Dilthey’s belief  in the historicity of  all understanding and the 
possibility of  universally valid understanding will be discussed further below. For now, we 
should emphasize the genuine insight behind Dilthey’s solution to the crisis of  historicism. 
While the skeptic is ready to dismiss the possibility of  understanding by appealing to our 
historical situatedness, Dilthey suggests that our historical situatedness is precisely what 
makes understanding possible. It is because we are historically situated that we have access 
to the life-nexus: all that we experience helps us acquire an understanding of  the greater 
whole of  historical development, and our understanding of  history in turn helps us acquire a 
better understanding of  lived experience. The immediate consequence of  Dilthey’s solution 
to the crisis of  historicism is therefore that our historical situatedness becomes essential for 
the possibility of  understanding, and that the activity of  understanding itself  becomes a 
source of  possibility. By learning to historicize ourselves and our lived experience, we are 
able to recognize both the narrowness of  our experience and the possibility of  experiencing 
otherwise. 
HUSSERL AND THE CRISIS OF HISTORICISM
Like Dilthey, Husserl (2001) believed that the phenomenality of  experience is the only 
genuine starting point for understanding. In the Logical Investigations, Husserl represents 
phenomenology as the description of  lived experience: a self-reflective analysis in which we 
turn our focus from the “naïve” positing of  independently existing objects to the essence 
of  conscious experience itself  (96-97). For Husserl, consciousness is always consciousness of  
something. It is intentional in the sense that it is always directed at some content. This implies 
the possibility of  phenomenology as a science of  intentionality, i.e., a science of  the essence 
of  what is intended in consciousness as well as the way in which is intended (127-28). What 
is required is a reflective turn toward the meaning of  what we are conscious of—or as he 
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frames it in Ideas I, a “phenomenological epoché”: a bracketing of  the “natural attitude” 
and an analysis of  the world as it is given (1983, 65-66). 
 When Dilthey (2010) read Husserl’s Logical Investigations he described it as “epoch-making” 
and compared it to his own descriptive psychology (30, 34).9 He began a correspondence 
with Husserl in 1905, and soon after Husserl (1977) would also recognize a kinship between 
Dilthey’s descriptive psychology and phenomenology (25). Yet where Dilthey and Husserl 
remained at odds with one another was in their solutions to the crisis of  historicism. This 
became clear with Husserl’s publication of  “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” in 1911: a 
text that marks the first indication of  what I propose we call the “Dilthey-Husserl debate.”10
 In this article Husserl argues that phenomenology is the sole means by which philosophy 
can become genuinely scientific, and he does this by criticizing two alternatives: naturalistic 
philosophy and world-view philosophy (2002, 253). By “world-view philosophy,” Husserl 
designates a kind of  philosophy which he considers a “child of  historicistic skepticism”: a 
philosophy which suggests that all sciences and philosophies are derived from the world-
view of  their age, and that all world-views are themselves teleologically linked in the course 
of  history (283-86). Husserl’s reference to “world-view philosophy” here is significant in that 
Dilthey had published an article earlier that year titled, “The Types of  World-View and 
their Development in Metaphysical Systems.” Dilthey suggests in this article that a select 
few world-views have served as background understandings for societies’ interpretations 
of  the meaning and sense of  world, and—contra historical relativism—these world-views 
have their legitimacy in the fact that they are rooted in the overall structure of  the life-nexus 
(Dilthey 2019, 258-62). While Dilthey meant for his account of  world-views to propose an 
alternative to skepticism, Husserl evidently did not accept this conclusion. In “Philosophy 
as a Rigorous Science” he identifies “world-view philosophy” as the sole form of  philosophy 
that is left after one has accepted historical relativism, and he moves to criticize it.   
 What is interesting is where Husserl does—and does not—include Dilthey within 
his discussion. As soon he turns to the crisis of  historicism, Husserl makes use of  several 
passages from Dilthey.11 He observes with Dilthey that the rise of  historical consciousness 
has made people lose faith in their age’s values and ways of  life, and he further observes 
that the logic of  historicism can be used to relativize any science which pursues objective 
validity. Husserl (2002) concludes: “when historicism is consistently carried through to its 
conclusion, one ends up with extreme skeptical subjectivism” (280).
9 In the following years, Dilthey would become the first prominent German philosopher to use Husserl’s 
work in his own courses, and would even begin using the term “phenomenology” alongside “descriptive 
psychology” in his unpublished writings (Ermarth 1978, 197, 204).
10 I have chosen to speak of  the “Dilthey-Husserl debate” only to emphasize the significant divergence 
between these thinkers on the question of  our concern: the limits of  historicizing and the nature of  
historicity. Dilthey and Husserl themselves never engaged in an actual debate or public disagreement. In 
fact (as I hope I have made clear), Dilthey and Husserl shared much in common, and greatly admired 
one another’s work.
11 Specifically, Husserl (2002) makes use of  passages from “The Types of  World-View and Their Devel-
opment in Metaphysical Systems” (279-80).
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 From this point Husserl asserts the need to bracket the fact of  our historical situatedness, 
and he questions whether historical facts should have any pertinence to understanding 
whatsoever. He writes:
The foregoing should suffice to gain the concession that—
however great are the difficulties that the relationship between 
what obtains in the flux and objective validity . . . may pose to the 
clarifying understanding—the distinction and opposition must be 
acknowledged. (280-81)
Husserl insists upon an opposition between historical facts and objectively valid 
understanding, and implies that the threat of  skepticism is ultimately a decisive argument 
against historical consciousness itself. If  our awareness of  the historicity of  all things conflicts 
with the possibility of  genuine understanding, then this awareness needs to be abstracted 
from altogether: we should pursue objective validity over against historical facts. Husserl 
goes on to conclude that we should set our sights on a philosophical science that does not 
“get bogged down in the historical” (293-94). Where “historical-critical activity” takes into 
consideration only what has factually existed, a genuine philosophical science would be 
one which carries out “the phenomenological seizing upon essences”: a seizing of  the ideal content 
or “essence” of  what is experienced in time. This alone can constitute the foundation of  a 
rigorous science: knowledge of  what is “pure” (272-75).
 It is telling that Dilthey’s name drops out of  Husserl’s discussion the moment he begins 
to argue that we should abstract from what is historical. Despite the fact that Dilthey’s 
critique of  historical reason is concerned precisely with reconceiving of  understanding in 
the awareness that we cannot transcend our historical situatedness, Husserl omits Dilthey’s 
project from his focus at precisely this moment. Dilthey is considered merely in a brief  
footnote:   
Dilthey likewise rejects historicistic skepticism; but I fail to understand 
how he can believe he has obtained from his very instructive analysis 
of  the structure and typology of  world-views decisive reasons against 
skepticism. For as is argued above in the text, a human science (which 
is, after all, empirical) can argue neither against nor for anything that 
lays claim to objective validity. (2002, 281 n. 13)
Husserl is right that there is a conflict between Dilthey’s commitment to the possibility 
of  objectively valid understanding and his emphasis on the historical situatedness of  
understanding. If  we continue to demand that understanding remain valid outside of  
our own circumstances, we will be vulnerable to the criticism of  the skeptic. Yet Husserl’s 
criticism of  Dilthey goes one step further than this: he implies that skepticism could only be 
rejected with a complete bracketing of  the historicity of  understanding. Husserl asserts that 
what is required over and beyond the historicizing of  consciousness is a phenomenological 
seizing of the essence of  historicity itself, and thus a philosophical science which abstracts 
from its own historicity in order to approach it as an object of  analysis. 
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 Husserl’s footnote points to a central divergence between Dilthey and Husserl: a 
divergence concerning the interpretation of  historicity. While Dilthey’s conception of  
understanding allows him to suggest that any interpretation we might have of  our historical 
situatedness is itself  something historically situated—and therefore something that remains 
to be re-interpreted by way of  reference to the lived realities of  others—Husserl’s conception 
of  understanding requires that we bracket our historical situatedness and analyze it as if  we 
were looking from “above.” For Husserl, any “understanding” of  our historical situation 
that is itself  attributable to the particulars of  our historical situation is not an understanding 
at all—it is not a seizing of the essence of  historicity itself. This divergence can be seen even 
more clearly in Dilthey and Husserl’s correspondence after the publication of  “Philosophy 
as a Rigorous Science.” After reading the article, Dilthey wrote to Husserl and rejected 
Husserl’s characterization of  his work as historicist (Biemel 1968, 434-36). Dilthey asserts 
that Husserl fails to show that a “systematic investigation based on history” is tantamount to 
either historicism or skepticism: he passes over the possibility that understanding might be 
reconceived in such a way that embraces the situatedness of  lived experience. In his reply 
to Dilthey, Husserl denies that any of  his arguments were directed against Dilthey (438). He 
explains that he did not mean to include Dilthey in his attack on skepticism, and that he 
intends to publish a clarificatory note in order to prevent further misinterpretations. 12 
 Husserl’s response to Dilthey makes no mention of  the footnote in which he suggests 
that Dilthey failed to overcome skepticism. It is a surprising omission, and it makes us 
wonder: given that Dilthey conceived of  understanding as inseparably linked to the activity 
of  historicizing, how could Husserl have recognized Dilthey’s philosophical project as 
anything but skepticism? In this 1911 correspondence Dilthey and Husserl simply cannot 
help but speak past one another—and the reason for this lies in the essential difference 
between their approaches to the interpretation of  historicity: (1) Dilthey a hermeneutic 
treatment of  historicity, and (2) Husserl a transcendental treatment of  historicity. By making 
this distinction, my intention is not to imply that Dilthey’s thought is lacking in any kind 
of  transcendentalism, or that Husserlian phenomenology is transcendentalism at its core.13 
Instead, this distinction concerns solely the divergence between Dilthey and Husserl’s 
approaches to the question, how can we understand our historical situatedness in such a way that 
does not lead to skepticism? For Dilthey, the answer lies in a radical concept of  historicizing. 
We use what is given to us in experience to interpret our historical circumstances, we use 
this interpretation to clarify the meaning of  our lived experience, and then we turn again 
to what is given to us in experience to re-interpret our historical circumstances. This is 
a distinctively hermeneutic treatment: the interpretation of  our historical situatedness is 
potentially endless insofar as our sense for history is recognized as historically situated 
itself. For Husserl, on the other hand, the answer lies in the task of  understanding our 
12 At one point, Husserl even writes: “it really seems to me that there are no serious differences between 
us. I believe that a long conversation would lead to full understanding” (438, my translation).
13 As I will discuss, Dilthey’s project is often read as containing transcendental elements. See: Ermarth 
(1978, 355-57) and De Mul (2014, 158-59).
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historical situatedness in such a way that is not historically situated. This is a distinctively 
transcendental treatment: we pursue the possibility of  an understanding that lies beyond the 
limits of  historicizing—an understanding of  historical situatedness itself. In characterizing 
Husserl’s approach as transcendental, note that even the insistence that our understanding 
of  historicity is achieved in historically specific circumstances is not enough to negate its 
transcendental character.14 It remains the case that we are determined not to “get bogged 
down in the historical”: our understanding of  historicity will not be an understanding at 
all if  it exhibits any kind of  historically-situated standpoint. Where but to a transcendental 
standpoint could we be headed?
 Some scholars have suggested that Husserl better distinguishes his treatment of  historicity 
from transcendentalism after Dilthey’s death in the fall of  1911.15 After all, Husserl was 
always aware that consciousness is factually situated in historical circumstances. As Husserl 
writes to Georg Misch in 1930: 
[I want to] make plain that the ‘ahistorical Husserl’ had to have at 
times distanced himself  from history (which he nevertheless had 
constantly had in view) precisely in order to come so far in method 
as to pose scientific questions in regard to it. (Husserl, quoted in 
Scharff 2018, 38)  
Following Heidegger’s (2008) Being and Time, Husserl insists to Misch that his 
phenomenological method never sought to abandon history altogether—the goal was 
instead to examine history as an object for phenomenological analysis. Yet as Robert 
C. Scharff (2018) has rightly observed, Husserl continues to approach the historicity of  
consciousness in this statement as an object of  analysis (something “in view”) rather than 
the context within which we analyze (38). We still see the same difference: while Dilthey 
approaches our historicity as a context that can never be brought entirely into view, Husserl 
indicates that our historicity can be understood in such a way that our understanding of  it 
does not lead back to our historical situatedness.
 This is seen equally in Husserl’s Crisis of  the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology 
(1970). From the beginning of  the Crisis Husserl is concerned with the historicity of  
phenomenological analysis, and this concern leads him to the concept of  the life-world 
(Lebenswelt). Husserl (1970) observes that all philosophical thinking and scientific inquiry 
emerges in the context of  the “life-world”: the pre-given background of  senses and meanings 
that is there for us in everyday experience (70-73, 124-25). The life-world is the “horizon” 
within which we live, acquire values, and interact with others. While previous philosophers 
14 For instance, Husserl recognizes “the tremendous value of  history in the broadest sense for the 
philosopher.” Yet he moves from this recognition to immediately assert that phenomenology must take a 
philosophical perspective on the historical field (Husserl 2002, 283).
15 For instance, see Johnson 1980, 78.
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have sought to achieve objective a priori knowledge, Husserl insists that any such knowledge 
is necessarily posited on the basis of  “the life-world a priori” and the pre-given horizon of  
meaning within which we pursue knowledge (103-11). Accordingly, metaphysical accounts 
are always founded on a suppression of  the life-world—and phenomenology, insofar as 
it concerns itself  with the historicity of  experience, is tasked with a complete change in 
orientation: a change in which the life-world itself  is made the object of  a “universal epoché” 
(148-51). 
 Husserl’s concept of  the life-world shares important similarities with Dilthey’s concept 
of  the life-nexus.16 Both concepts serve as reminders that the sciences are rooted in pre-
reflective experience. Both concepts are offered as a critique of  metaphysics. Most relevant 
for our purposes, both concepts assert the essential historicity of  consciousness and 
understanding. Yet in spite of  these similarities, Husserl’s attempt in the Crisis to bracket 
and analyze the life-world falls back into his earlier treatment of  historicity. While the life-
world is the horizon within which we carry out the phenomenological reduction, it is also 
something we are able to bracket as an object of  analysis. Husserl (1970) writes:
But can we be content with this? Can we be satisfied simply with 
the notion that human beings are subjects for the world and at the same 
time are objects in this world? . . . The epoché, in giving us the attitude 
above the subject-object correlation which belongs to the world and 
thus the attitude of  focus upon the transcendental subject-object correlation, 
leads us to recognize, in self-recognition, that the world that exists 
for us, that is, our world in its being and being-such, takes its ontic 
meaning entirely from our intentional life through a priori types of  
accomplishments that can be exhibited rather than argumentatively 
constructed or conceived through mythical thinking. (180-81)
Contrary to the suggestion that Husserl’s Crisis marks a significant departure from his early 
work, we can see that Husserl approaches historicity in much the same way.17 While the 
life-world is the historically-situated context in which we attempt a change in orientation, 
the change in orientation which characterizes the phenomenological epoché allows us to 
bracket the life-world itself  as an object and analyze it as though we are “above” it. The 
possibility of  understanding historicity itself  is retained, even with the recognition that the 
life-world is the context within which we understand. 
 Husserl’s treatment of  historicity is seen even more clearly in his appendix to the 
Crisis, the “Origin of  Geometry.” Husserl (1989) insists that any historical fact necessarily 
presupposes “the universal a priori of  history” insofar as the facts of  history are rooted in 
the structure of  what is generally human: the “unity of  traditionalization” that underlies 
all past life-worlds (174). Husserl is careful to note that this unity is undetermined, and that 
the structure of  historicity is open in its forward movement (173). Yet Husserl’s reduction 
of  historicity to the essential structure of  “universal historicity” nevertheless frames 
16 See Makkreel (1982, 40, 44).
17 See Carr (1974); Noé (1992); Johnson (1980).
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phenomenological analysis in opposition to a historicizing interpretation. For Husserl, the 
phenomenological epoché achieves something over and beyond historicizing.
WHY THE DILTHEY-HUSSERL DEBATE MATTERS  
FOR CRITICAL PHENOMENOLOGY
The relevance of  the Dilthey-Husserl debate for critical phenomenology can be seen 
by focusing on a single tendency in critical phenomenological research: the tendency to 
historicize lived experience. As Weiss, Murphy, and Salamon (2020) have suggested, critical 
phenomenology refers to a line of  critical analysis which “mobilizes phenomenological 
description in the service of  a reflexive inquiry into how power relations structure experience 
as well as our ability to analyze that experience” (xiv). The “reflexive inquiry” that is 
particular to critical phenomenology involves an attention to “the multiple ways in which 
power moves through our bodies and our lives”: how power relations structure the ways we 
see (i.e., perceptual patterns), the ways we feel (i.e., our affective state), etc. Now as Salamon 
emphasizes, this reflexive inquiry is in large part consistent with classical phenomenology: 
we find in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty a similar emphasis on the fact that experience is 
always situated within multiple horizons of  significance (including social and historical 
horizons). Yet critical phenomenology extends the concerns of  classical phenomenology 
by reflecting on the socio-historical structural conditions of  its own emergence (Salamon 
2018, 12). Lisa Guenther (2020) distinguishes critical phenomenology’s focus from that of  
classical phenomenology as follows: 
[Classical phenomenology] lights up the transcendental structures 
that we rely upon to make sense of  things but which we routinely fail 
to acknowledge. In other words, phenomenology points us in a critical 
direction. But where classical phenomenology remains insufficiently 
critical is in failing to give a rigorous account of  how contingent 
historical and social structures also shape our experience, not merely 
empirically . . . but in a quasi-transcendental way . . . Structures 
like “patriarchy,” “white supremacy,” and “heteronormativity” 
permeate, organize, and reproduce the natural attitude in ways that 
go beyond any particular object of  thought. These are not things to 
be seen but rather “ways of  seeing” . . . We overlook them at our peril, 
even if  our project is transcendental, because they are part of  what 
we must bracket to get into the phenomenological attitude. (11-12)
Guenther suggests that critical phenomenology distinguishes itself  from classical 
phenomenology through its concern with the contingent socio-historical structures 
that shape our experience. Much like transcendental structures, “whiteness” and 
“heteronormativity” are not given to us in lived experience—they are conditions of  
experience, or “ways of  seeing.” Yet while classical phenomenology might acknowledge 
“whiteness” and “heteronormativity” as life-world concerns, its focus on the transcendental 
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structures of  experience leads to the complete bracketing of  these structures. Classical 
phenomenology fails to reckon with the reality that these “quasi-transcendental” structures 
continue to structure the phenomenological attitude itself—thus suggesting the need for 
an analysis which moves further in a critical direction. Critical phenomenology attempts 
this analysis by asserting that phenomenological description is itself  conditioned by power 
relations, and that the phenomenologist needs to turn back and interrogate the conditions 
of  the phenomenological attitude itself. The critical phenomenologist works to extend 
phenomenological description to objects of  social and political critique—e.g., violence, 
racial injustice, gender inequality, etc.—and thereby redirects the self-reflective character 
of  phenomenology against itself.
 We can see immediately the relevance of  the Dilthey-Husserl debate for critical 
phenomenology. After all, Dilthey and Husserl’s disagreement concerned the interpretation 
of  historicity. Given that critical phenomenology asserts the need to turn back on 
the phenomenological attitude and interrogate its socio-historical conditions, critical 
phenomenology demonstrates a similar occupation with the reality of  our historical 
situatedness. Along this line, Weiss and Andrew Cutrofello (2019) have emphasized 
the significance of  critical phenomenology’s use of  histories by suggesting that critical 
phenomenology is committed “to looking backward and taking responsibility for the 
injustices that have been committed in the past” (348). In particular, Weiss and Cutrofello 
observe that critical phenomenology is concerned with silent histories: histories that have 
contributed to the constitution of  our experience without ever becoming visible to us. The 
critical phenomenologist attempts to recover these silent histories in order to open us to a 
more critical perspective on the way we experience things, and in this way they chart a path 
toward criticism through the historicization of  lived experience. 
 But what exactly is the critical phenomenologist doing when they historicize the ways 
we experience things? As we have seen, Dilthey and Husserl acknowledged that lived 
experience is always historically situated. Yet they diverged on the question of  how we can 
understand our historical situatedness without falling back into skepticism. Dilthey and 
Husserl’s different approaches led them to conceive of  historicity in significantly different 
ways, and depending on the way in which critical phenomenology approaches the treatment 
of  our historicity, its commitment to historicizing could be two very different things. So 
what is historicizing?—or what should historicizing be?
 Given that Husserl attempts to bracket and analyze the structure of  historicity itself, 
his treatment of  historicity is in clear tension with the aims of  critical phenomenology. 
Consider what Husserl’s approach implies for the activity of  historicizing. Insofar as 
historicity is conceived in this way, the activity of  historicizing takes on a specific meaning: 
to historicize the way we experience things is to interpret our experience against the 
background of  a life-world whose own meaning is tied to the overarching unity of  history. 
Even with the specification that this unity is “open” or “undetermined” in its meaning, 
historicizing is made into the activity of  relating what is given to structures which are more 
fundamental: the unity that is implied by the historicity our society, of  our historical period, 
etc. As Rudolf  A. Makkreel (1982) has suggested, Husserl’s analysis of  the historical world 
amounts to a kind of  Abbau (deconstruction): a movement from “higher levels” of  the life-
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world (i.e., what is given in lived experience) to increasingly “lower levels” which ground the 
higher levels (i.e., what is essential in universal historicity itself) (55). Such a deconstructive 
approach is rooted in the belief  that we can bracket our historical situatedness: we are able 
to deconstruct the structure of  historicity precisely because we are able to speak and think 
about historicity without evidencing it. 
 But who decides what the structure of  historicity consists in? Must not the determination 
of  more “fundamental” levels of  the life-world itself be historically situated and thus an 
object to historicize? In response to this question, David Carr (1974) has pointed out that 
“the whole idea of  a historical reduction makes no sense except on the assumption of  (an) 
ahistorical truth” (248).18 As soon as we posit the structure of  historicity as an “ahistorical 
truth,” however, we are still confronted with the same question: how is this truth conditioned 
by what is historical? Must we leave this question unanswered?—and if  so, why? This was 
precisely Dilthey’s (2010) concern when, after reading “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science,” 
he observed that Husserl is able to interpret life only by abstracting from the “whole of  life” 
(257). If  the activity of  historicizing experience is made dependent on a commitment to 
historicity as an ahistorical truth, then our ability to historicize experience would be made 
dependent on our willingness to uncritically stop as soon as we arrive at more “fundamental” 
levels of  the life-world. Historicizing would have to give way to a kind of  ahistoricizing.
 Critical phenomenology’s commitment to analyzing the socio-historical conditions of  
phenomenological description itself  sets it in clear opposition to this Husserlian concept of  
historicizing. To historicize in this way would be to accept that the silent histories behind 
our ideas of  “what historicity is” ought to remain silent, and to ignore Guenther’s warning 
that “[w]e overlook them at our peril.” Consider Sara Ahmed’s (2006) discussion of  the 
phenomenological epoché in Queer Phenomenology. After observing that the phenomenologist 
brackets the life-world and attends to the essence of  what is experienced, she emphasizes 
that the domestic world which is bracketed in this process continues to condition the 
phenomenological attitude: 
What does it mean to assume that bracketing can “transcend” the 
familiar world of  experience? Perhaps to bracket does not mean to 
transcend, even if  we put something aside. We remain reliant on 
what we put in brackets . . . What is ‘put aside,’ we might say, is the 
very space of  the familiar, which is also what clears the philosopher’s 
table and allows him to do his work. (33-34).
In the phenomenological attitude, the phenomenologist continues to make use of  language, 
the body, material things such as paper, a desk, etc.—all things which have a history. As 
Ahmed says, “[w]e remain reliant on what we put in brackets”: we remain historically 
situated even when we bracket our own historicity. What is especially important in Ahmed’s 
discussion here is the implication that we need to historicize beyond what phenomenology 
allows, i.e., to historicize even the phenomenological attitude. Ahmed asserts the need 
to investigate histories which condition the phenomenological attitude, and this includes 
18 Johnson (1980) makes the same claim as Carr in his own discussion of  Husserl (87-88).
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histories which have shaped our experience of  “gendered bodies.” Once we recognize that 
the phenomenological epoché presupposes a masculine subject who is able to “disappear” 
from his situatedness and inhabit the phenomenological attitude, we are led to the possibility 
of  a queer phenomenology: an analysis which would “turn the tables” on phenomenology 
and examine its own gendered conditions (63).
 By suggesting the need to historicize whatever is said of  historicity, critical phenomenology 
turns back on Dilthey and Husserl’s disagreement and moves in the direction of  Dilthey’s 
interpretation of  historicity. As we have seen, Dilthey believed that it is only through 
the activity of  historicizing that we come to understand our historical situatedness. For 
Dilthey, there is no point at which understanding is permitted to separate itself  from 
historicizing—to understand our historical situatedness we have to historicize understanding 
itself, and recognize that even our ideas about our historical situatedness are historical. 
Correspondingly, the activity of  historicizing is something entirely different for Dilthey. 
While for Husserl our historical situatedness can be brought into view and interpretatively 
deconstructed (Abbau), for Dilthey our historical situatedness can never be brought entirely 
into view—our interpretation of  it is necessarily a constructive activity (Aufbau) (Makkreel 
1982, 55). Whatever our interpretation of  history might be, this interpretation must always 
be re-opened through the activity of  historicizing: we have to recognize that our sense for 
history is contingent, and then attempt to construct the history behind our sense of  history 
by way of  appeal to what is given in experience—e.g., the expressions of  others, cultural 
systems, works of  art, political movements, etc. This is why the activity of  historicizing 
becomes for Dilthey a source of  radical possibility. To historicize experience is to recognize 
the contingency of  the way we experience things, and to open ourselves to the possibility of  
experiencing otherwise.
 Here is where I think Dilthey—and reflection on the Dilthey-Husserl debate—has 
relevance for critical phenomenological research. Insofar as Dilthey approaches our 
historical situatedness as an object of  historical interpretation, his analysis leads us to 
conceive of  the activity of  historicizing not as giving meaning to our experiential life, but as 
continually re-opening the question of  the meaning of  our experiential life in a way that allows 
for critical interrogation. Stated more simply, Dilthey’s recognition that our historicity needs 
to be historicized itself  moves toward the insight that subjects can be situated in history in 
vastly different ways, and historical interpretation is precisely what enables us to criticize 
conceptions of  history which suppress this difference. While critical phenomenologists have 
made extensive use of  historicizing, their commitment to examining the ways that power 
conditions the phenomenological attitude has largely led them to steer clear of  the notion 
of  “historicity.” If  we follow Dilthey’s thinking about historicizing, however, it becomes 
possible to speak of  the plural historicities, i.e., historically specific ways of  relating to and 
becoming situated within history. 
 In Solitary Confinement, Guenther (2013) approaches this alternative way of  thinking about 
historicity when she describes the reality of  “social death.” She explains that the socially 
dead (e.g., prisoners in solitary confinement) are persons who are “excluded, dominated, 
or humiliated to the point of  becoming dead to the rest of  society” (xx). Such people 
are removed from the network of  intersubjective relations which alone makes possible 
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personhood, but equally also from the relations which make possible a historical horizon. 
Guenther observes that socially dead persons become separated from both past and future 
generations, and therefore abandoned to an existence that is separated from a historical 
community. She asks: “Without a living relation to past and future generations, who am I? 
Do I still have a stake in historical time?” (xxiii). 
 As soon as Guenther’s analysis brings her to the point of  recognizing that intersubjectivity 
is fundamental to the possibility of  historicity, she asks herself: is it possible to fall out of  
our situatedness within history? Is the character of  historical existence itself  dependent on 
our being positioned within a network of  intersubjective relations?—and thus a privilege 
for some and not others? What is significant about this moment in Solitary Confinement is that 
Guenther draws on the histories of  prisoners in solitary confinement in order to arrive at 
the suggestion that our historicity is something contingent. To be “historically situated” is 
to experience in a socially and historically privileged way, and if  we attempt to interpret the 
history behind one’s “historical situatedness,” we will be brought before the possibility of  
experiencing otherwise. 
 If  critical phenomenologists are to consider the silent histories behind our historical 
situatedness—and thus to speak of  the plural historicities—they will need to take 
a hermeneutic approach to historicity. It is here that Dilthey’s opposition to Husserl is 
informative for critical phenomenology. As we find in Dilthey’s reevaluation of  understanding, 
the condition of  being historical does not need to be approached transcendentally—it 
can also be approached by way of  historical interpretation. This is what is entailed by 
a radical concept of  historicizing. Now in arguing for the advantages of  a hermeneutic 
approach to historicity, my intention is not at all to represent Dilthey as a model for 
critical phenomenology. As I have mentioned, Dilthey’s treatment of  historicity has been 
as much a problem for hermeneutic thinking as it has been a solution. Heidegger and 
Gadamer, for instance, directed strong criticisms at Dilthey for his continued commitment 
to the possibility of  objectively valid understanding.19 Despite asserting the historical 
situatedness of  understanding, Dilthey’s fear of  lapsing into skepticism led him to assert 
that an understanding of  what is given in experience can only be considered genuine 
if  it remains valid outside of  its own situatedness. Dilthey maintains that our historical 
situatedness is simultaneously that which makes possible understanding and that which 
limits understanding (Linge 1973, 544). 
 As a way of  conclusion, however, I believe the insight in Dilthey’s response to Husserl in 
1911—that it is possible to reconceive of  understanding as an essentially historical activity—
can be read as the promise of  a genuinely hermeneutic treatment of  historicity. Such a 
reading would allow us to say that critical phenomenology belongs within the tradition 
that has worked to fulfill this promise. Heidegger (2009), for one, observed that Dilthey was 
the first to achieve “a truly radical awareness” of  the problem of  historicity, but that what 
remained to be further developed in his work was the ontological character of  historicity (72). 
19 See, for instance, Heidegger (2008, 454-55, 2011); Gadamer (2013, 222-44).
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In Being and Time, Heidegger tells us that his project of  a fundamental ontology of  Dasein 
is an extension of  Dilthey’s hermeneutical project, but one which grasps that Dasein is 
historical in its being, and that even its historicity needs to be understood in terms of  its 
factical Being-in-the-world (Heidegger 2008, 454-55).20  Gadamer’s philosophical project 
has similarly emerged out of  an engagement with Dilthey. Like Heidegger, Gadamer (2013) 
asserts that Dilthey’s concept of  historicity needs to extended beyond his commitment to 
the possibility of  objectively valid understanding what is required is the acknowledgement 
that “[t]o be historically means that knowledge of  oneself  can never be complete” (313).21 
Any understanding we might have of  our historical situatedness is necessarily rooted in 
“prejudices,” i.e., the “biases of  our openness to the world,” and thus remains to be taken 
as an object of  historical understanding itself  (Gadamer 2008, 9).22  
 Critical phenomenologists’ efforts to re-problematize the relationship between 
phenomenology and history should be seen as an extension of  this same line of  hermeneutic 
thinking. Insofar as critical phenomenology is committed to analyzing what is historically-
specific in phenomenology’s focus on transcendental structures, historicity itself  needs to 
be made an object for historical interpretation—and one finds precisely this effort in the 
tradition of  philosophical hermeneutics since Dilthey. Perhaps this is what we discover in 
revisiting the Dilthey-Husserl debate, then: an opportunity for critical phenomenology to 
reconsider its historical roots. 
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